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INTRODUCTION
Despitethe fact that the bulk of housing services in urban
areas is provided by existing dwelling units, our empirical
and theoretical understanding of how existing dwelling
units are operated over time to produce housing services is meager.
Early analyses of this topic focused on the change in quality or in
relative quality ranking of existing dwelling units. This change,
termed filtering, is typically represented in early studies as a reduced
form combination of supply and demand behavior (Lowry 1960;
Smith 1964). Recently, models that more fully specify the supply
and demand side of the market for existing units have been
developed, some of which use simulation techniques to represent the
supply and demand decisions of housing producers and households
(de Leeuw 1972) while others apply the optimal control theory
approach (Sweeney 1974).
An alternative model of the housing market's supply side focuses
not on the production of housing services from combinations of
existing units and operating inputs, but on the production of
dwelling units from combinations of land and capital. Partial empiri-
cal tests of that model have been made by examining residential
Note: This study is based on research funded by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development under contract H-1843 to the Urban Studies Group of
the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors wish to thank their
colleagues in the group for many thoughtful comments. In particular, John F.
Kain made extensive comments on an early draft, and William Apgar and
Herman Leonard helped clarify several conceptual issues.
273274 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
density gradients in urban areas (Muth 1969; Mills 1970). That
model is used to analyze long-run investments in housing stocks,
whereas our concern in this study is with the shorter-run operations
of existing units.
The model presented here differs from most other analyses of the
supply side of the housing market in its treatment of housing services
produced by existingunits. The model allows more than one
structure type; and existing housing capital as well as housing
outputs are assumed to be structure-type-specific. In addition,
substitution between housing capital and operating inputs is incorpo-
rated in the production of structure quality. This approach can be
contrasted with other recent work on housing supply that either
treats housing capital as homogeneous or does not allow for substitu-
tion between capital and operating inputs (de Leeuw 1972; Sweeney
1974).
The model's major focus in on how housing producers operate
existing dwelling units to produce housing services. Existing units are
described in terms of three summary characteristics—structure qual-
ity, structure type, and neighborhood quality—that differ by mode
of production or supply elasticity. The production of structure
quality is treated in terms that parallel the choice of optimal plant
size in the theory of the firm, and structure quality is produced by
heterogeneous capital and operating inputs. Decisions about struc-
ture type follow the usual assumptions of investment theory.
Neighborhood quality is assumed to be a local public good not
produced by housing entrepreneurs. The model also includes some
determinants of supply response, such as cash flow constraints, that
may have significant impacts upon short-run adjustments in the
housing market.
The analytic framework of the model is outlined and estimates of
the supply parameters are given. Numerical experiments are per-
formed with the supply model to determine likely values for the
magnitude and duration of the increases in short-run average costs of
structure quality that might accompany a housing market policy,
such as a housing allowance, that suddenly increased the demand for
structure quality. The supply model is combined with a demand
model in a primitive market-clearing framework, and several com-
parative static equilibrium sensitivity analyses of model parameters
are carried out. Appendix 8A contains a brief description of the
estimation of the elasticity of substitution between capital and
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CHARACTERIZATION OF HOUSING PRODUCTION
Inthis model, housing is a composite of several characteristics, and
dwelling units are available with specific combinations of these
characteristics. We define the housing services produced by dwelling
units in terms of their characteristics as:
Housing services8 =(Q8, N,A)
whereis the quality of structure services produced by a unit of
structure type s;Nis the quality of the neighborhood of the unit;
and A is the accessibility of the unit. The rents for particular
dwelling units are determined by all three characteristics; but for
existing units, only Q8,thestructure quality, can be varied. In this
analysis we ignore accessibility and incorporate neighborhood quality
to the extent that it affects the production of structure quality. We
focus on the supply of structure quality, the one characteristic of
existing units that is under the control of housing producers.
Structure services are produced from three components—land,
capital,and operating inputs—which differ significantly in their
durability. At the extremes, land is infinitely durable, and operating
inputs are completely consumed during production. The capital that
is used to produce structure quality has a range of durabilities. Many
basic capital components of a dwelling unit are very durable, while
the interior finish of a unit, its mechanical subsystems, and many of
its exterior features have relatively short lives. Although an average
depreciation rate can be calculated for the capital in a given dwelling
unit, that rate is a function of the mix of capital stocks in the unit. It
is apparent that a variation of the index number problem exists for
the representation of housing capital depreciation.'
Besides having a variety of durabilities, the capital in a dwelling
unit also differs in terms of its substitutability in the production
process that yields structure quality. Structure quality is subscripted
by structure type, and we assume some minimum stock and con-
figuration of capital is required in order to produce structure quality
of a particular structure type. Minimum stock includes the unit's
foundation and shell, and is essentially an entry requirement on the
supplyside. Once this minimum stockisavailable, a housing
producer can produce structure quality with operating inputs and
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zero;KT8 <
f(K3,O);KT8>
where C8 is the minimum stock of capital required for the produc-
tion of structure quality of structure type s,0represents operating
inputs, and KT is a unit's total capital.
Categorizing a dwelling unit's capital in terms of its durability and
substitutability in the production of structure quality is an interest-
ing topic for research, but one we will not pursue here. Instead, we
assume that a dwelling unit's capital can be separated into two
categories, as we have done in the foregoing equation. The first
category, termed "structure capital," oris extremely durable and
has an (assumed) depreciation rate of zero. The second category,
termed "quality capital," or K5, is the capital required for the
production of structure quality of structure type a. Quality capital is
not very durable; it depreciates at an annual rate, d; and it can be
changed readily by incremental investment, termed "maintenance"
(M). Structure capital will not affect the production of quality by
existing units and will only be a factor in decisions about new
construction or the conversion of a unit from one structure type to
another. This categorization of a dwelling unit's capital implies that
its depreciation rate, averaged over both capital categories, increases
with the level of structure quality the unit produces.
Within this framework we assume that housing producers operate
individual dwelling units and try to maximize their profits. During
each time period they pick a level of operating inputs for their unit,
determine the expenditure on maintenance, and calculate whether it
would pay them to alter the structure type of their unit. We assume
that in making these decisions, the housing producer is familiar with
the operating requirements and debt structure of his building; that he
knows the prices of the inputs he uses; and that he has well-defined
expectations about the structure of rents in his neighborhood and
the way in which rents would vary with the quality of his unit.
In many respects the model we set forth parallels the analysis of
optimal plant size in the theory of the firm. In our model the
dwelling unit is the "plant," and the housing producer must invest or
disinvest in this plant over time so that he produces his "output,"
dwelling unit quality, in a least-cost way. In addition, housing
producers can have different kinds of plants (structure type) and buy
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ANALYTICS OF THE SUPPLY MODEL
Timein this model is treated as a series of discrete periods of one
year's duration. We assume the housing producer revises his operating
strategy at the beginning of each time period on a contracting or
market day. At this time he makes three decisions. The first deals
with the level of quality he will produce this period and how to do it.
The second involves the amount he will invest in the building this
period. The third is whether he should transform his unit into some
other structure type. We consider each of these decisions in turn.
TheCurrent-Period Operating Decision
Duringthe current period the housing producer's unit has a stock
of quality capital, embodied in it (for clarity, the subscript for
structure type is omitted). We assume that any maintenance expendi-
ture this period will not alter the stock of capital until the next
period, sois fixed in the current period. In addition, we assume
that rental receipts and expenditures on operating inputs are concur-
rent, with the result that no within-period discounting is required.
These two assumptions let us separate the housing producer's choice
of operating inputs from his choice of maintenance expenditures in
the current period.
The housing producer's opportunities for producing structure
quality with various combinations of operating inputs, and
quality capital,are summarized in a production function,
(8-1)
whereis the level of structure quality produced in period t. In
addition, the housing producer knows how gross rents will vary with
structure quality for his unit, and he knows P0, the price per unit of
operating inputs. Sincethe unit's stock of quality capital, is fixed
for the current the housing producer chooses operating
inputs to maximize his short-run profits or cash flow, defined as the
difference between gross rents and expenditures on operating
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where R(O; K, t) is the relation between gross rents and operating
inputs obtained by substituting the production function in Equation
(8-1) into the relation between gross rents and quality which is
known to the housing producer.
TheCurrent-Period Maintenance Decision
Thecurrent-period maintenance or investment decision is more
complicated than the choice of operating inputs because main-
tenance expenditures made this period will affect the stock of
quality capital of the unit in subsequent periods.2 Moreover, there
are constraints on the rate at which a housing producer can alter the
stock of quality capital in his unit. We assume, for example, that
maintenance must be non-negative: the housing producer cannot
reduce his stock of quality capital at a pace that exceeds the rate of
depreciation. In addition, if a housing producer wants to purchase
maintenance inputs in amounts that exceed his cash flow, he must
pay a higher interest rate than the opportunity cost of his cash flow,
a requirement that will tend to reduce his rate of investment. Given
these constraints, the housing producer's objective isto pick a
maintenance and operating input stream that maximizes the present
value of his net revenues. This objective can be stated as
00
maximize(R —P 0 —P —Fe) t at m (1+r)t
(8-3)
subject to the production function for quality and the accounting
relation for capital, maintenance, and depreciation:
(8-4)
In Equation (8-3),is the gross rent of the unit,is the price
per unit of maintenance,are the fixed costs exclusive of financing,
and risthe interest rate. If the relation between rents and dwelling
unit quality is known over time, a housing producer can calculate his
optimal time path for maintenance and operating inputs within the
framework of optimal control theory.3 However, this supply model
does not follow the formal optimal control procedure, but rather
represents the housing producer's decision about maintenance in a
simpler framework.
The major simplification we make is to relax the assumption that a
housing producer has perfect knowledge of the relation between
rents and quality over time. Instead, we assume he has an expecta-
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thattime, he projects a relation between rents and quality that does
not change. This simplification is based on the premise that housing
producers have some knowledge or expectation about how prices in
their neighborhood will be changing over the next few periods, and
what the relation bween rent and quality is likely to be after these
changes have occurred. Beyond his planning interval, however, a
housing producer's information about prices is poor, and he merely
projects his expectations for the fifth year into the future without
change.
This assumption about housing producers' price expectations fixes
the relation between rents and quality in future periods. By making
this relation fixed or stationary beyond the planning interval, we can
derive the optimal stock of quality capital that corresponds to the
future stationary state without using optimal control techniques, and
then choose a maintenance policy that will move the dwelling unit
toward the optimal capital stock. This approach may correspond
more closely to the way in which housing producers actually behave
while still being closely related to the behavior implicit in the optimal
control theory representation.
In the stationary state, where the expected relation between rent
and quality, the production function, and the input prices do not
change, the landlord's choice of and will also be
unchanging. This stationarity assumption implies, therefore, that
maintenance inputs exactly offset depreciation losses. Furthermore,
with the stationarity assumption, the Optimal stock of quality capital




whereis the price of a unit of quality capital for one period,
essentially the price of a capital flow.Sincemaintenance inputs
augment the stock of quality capital, we know that the price for a
unit of quality capital stock is If we keep the unit of capital for
one period, we must pay the going rate of interest on the capital, r. In
addition, we have assumed that quality capital depreciates at a
constant rate, d, during each period. Hence, to keep a unit of quality
capital for one period, a landlord must payr in interest and Pmd
in depreciation. The one-period price of quality capital is there-
fore(r +d),and this is the price that must satisfy the first-
order conditionsinEquation(8-5).By combining thefirst-
order conditions in Equations (8-5) and (8-2) with the produc-
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qualitycapital, the optimal fow of operating inputs, and the optimal
quality level to be produced at the end of the planning interval.
Having determined the optimal capital stock in the future station-
ary state, we now turn to the maintenance decision. Each dwelling
unit has an existing stock of quality capital, and the unit's
maintenance policy should lead to the optimal capital stock, K*,
during the planning interval. Let us consider first a situation in which
a unit's current stock of quality capital exceeds its optimal level. Since
we have assumed that maintenance inputs cannot be negative, the
unit's stock of quality capital cannot be reduced more rapidly than
the depreciation rate. That is, over the planning interval of T periods,




for in that case the purchase of maintenace inputs would slow the
rate at which the optimal level of capital stock is approached. If
Equation (8.6) does not apply, then some maintenance inputs will be
provided over the planning interval. In that case, the housing producer
determines what the most efficient stock of capital would be for the
quality level he has decided to produce during the current period, and
he attempts to move to that capital stock by the next time period. If
the most efficient stock of capital for quality level L is Ke(L), a
housing producer who is producing L this period will have a desired
level of maintenance,
M =Ke(L) —d) (8-7)
Since the most efficient capital stock for any quality level is a
function of the interest rate, the desired maintenance will also be a
function of the interest rate. In our discussion thus far we have used rg
ras the interest rate, implicitly assuming that this rate isthe
opportunity cost of internally generated funds. This assumption will
hold in the stationary state if the building is viable. When a housing
producer is adjusting his stock of quality capital in the short run,
however, maintenance expenditures may exceed cash flow for one or
more periods. We assume that there is an external interest rate, rx,
greaterthanat which additional funds can be borrowed.4 In the
short run, therefore, a housing producer's interest rate is related to
his cash flow, and his supply curve of funds resembles S, shown in
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grossrents less expenditures on operating inputs and other fixed
obligations such as taxes. Since fixed costs can vary, otherwise
similar units may have different cash flows. Desired maintenance
expenditures can be represented as a demand curve on Figure 8-1,
and curves M1, M2, and M3 illustrate possible outcomes.
Another constraint on the level of current maintenance expendi-
tures is its consistency with the optimal capital stock at the end of
the planning interval. That is, the maintenance for the current
period,must satisfy the condition
Ko(1_d)T+Mt(1_d)T_l (8-8)
Of course, when the housing producer's decision on maintenance
is made within a dynamic framework, the end of the planning
interval is never attained. During each time period the planning
interval covers the next T periods. This rolling interval is merely a
device that lets us represent the more distant future, when expecta-
tions are poorly defined, as a stationary state. In each current period
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The Structure-Type Decision
Thehousing producer's decisions about operating inputs and
maintenance are conditional on his decision concerning the structure
type of his unit. We consider the structure type decision last because
itsprerequisites are the current period's optimal operating and
maintenance decisions. We assume that a housing producer decides to
convert a unit from one structure type to another by comparing the
value of alternative types with the value of the current type and its
conversion cost. In this case, the value of a unit, V, is equal to the
discounted sum of net revenues from the unit, or
00 1
V=t0 (1 +r)t
whereF denotes fixed costs associated with the unit exclusive of
financing costs. In order to calculate the maximum value of a unit,
the optimal maintenance and operating strategy must be determined.
This is required for the structure type the housing producer has now,
as well as for alternative types he considers. For his existing unit, the
housing producer determines his expected net revenues during the
planning interval 'and during the postplanning-interval stationary
state. For alternative structure types, we assume the housing pro-
ducer immediately attains the optimal level of quality capital during'
conversion and calculates the value of alternative structure types
from their expected net revenues.
Abstracting from changes in lot size, the conversion cost from
structure type i to structure type jhastwo major components: The
firstisthe expenditure for additional structure capital or for
removing existing structure capital, or both. The second is the
expenditure on quality capital that is required to produce a unit of
structure type jwiththe optimal stock of quality capital. Let us
denote this total conversion cost as For all jstructuretypes, a
housing producer will convert from type i to type IifZ1> 0, where
(8-10)
I
Althoughwe will not consider it in detail in the model, at any
instant in time, a housing producer will be able to construct a new
unit of structure type jbypurchasing land, structure capital, and
quality capital. If we represent the cost of new construction by NC1,
then construction will occur if
(8-9)
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and will ultimately limit V.. Of course, will vary over time if
land pnces or the optimal quality level of a unit change. The costs of
conversion and new construction can limit possible values of V1 and
but many combinations of the two will produce neither struc-
ture-type conversions nor new construction.
Changein Neighborhood Quality
Weassume that housing producers do not have direct control over
the production of neighborhood quality. They may have expecta-
tions about how neighborhood qualitywill change over time,
however, and these expectations might influence their behavior. For
the moment we will not specify precisely the determinants of
neighborhood quality, although it is undoubtedly some amalgam of
the characteristics of dwelling units and households in an area. At
this point we will merely assume that neighborhood quality is a
neighborhood-specific public good.
SPECIFYINGTHE SUPPLY MODEL
Inthis section we specify the dimensions and parameters of a
housing supply model that incorporates many of the features
described in the previous sections. For the sake of simplicity the
model employs only two levels of neighborhood quality and two
structure types. Input prices vary by neighborhood, and the produc-
tion function for quality varies by structure type. Dwelling unit
quality can be produced at eight possible levels; so its representation
is more continuous than neighborhood quality or structure type.
Although the supply model includes neighborhoods, it does not
include location in this simple version. The model can be envisioned
as representing the housing market in a metropolitan area that has
been stratified into zones according to neighborhood quality level.
The model refers to aggregates of zones of each quality level and
otherwise ignores the location of particular units.
Since the major goal of the supply model is to represent the
operation of existing units, the construction of new units and the
conversion from one structure type to another are not endogenous.
Accordingly, the major parameters that must be determined in the
supply model are those in the production function for structure
quality. The data for determining these parameters are not as good as
we would like, but the available data do permit us to obtain
reasonable estimates of parameter values. We obtain production
function parameters for two structure types: a high-rise elevator
building and a small multiple unit building.284 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
ACES (constant elasticity of substitution) production function is
employed. This isflexible, yet simple, with properties that are
attractive for representing the production of structure quality. Using
K for quality capital, 0 for operation inputs, and Qforstructure
quality, the CES function is
Q=A[aKTa +(1 (8-12)
in the case of constant returns to scale. The parameters of this
function are A, the scaling or efficiency factor; r, the distribution
factor; and i3, the substitution factor, which determines 11(13 +1),the
elasticity of substitution between the factor inputs.
TheElasticity of Substitution
Theelasticity of substitution between operating inputs and quality
capital can be estimated by regressing the log of the ratio of dwelling
unit quality to operating inputs on the log of the ratio of their prices
(Arrow et al. 1961). We estimated this elasticity from a time series
sample compiled for small multiple units in the Boston area (Key
1973). This sample, which covers the period 1942-1969, includes
annual rental and expense information for twenty-nine apartment
buildings, the majority of which have fewer than fifty dwelling units.
These apartment buildings are operated by large real estate firms that
provide good quality middle-income housing and follow conscien-
tious maintenance practices. For this sample structure quality was
proxied by the annual average rent per room divided by the
Boston-area rent index; operating inputs are measured by the
price-adjusted operating expense per room. Both the consumer price
index and a fuel and utility index were used as measures of the price
of operating inputs. SOnedifficulty with these data is that rent
control was in effect from 1942 until March 1956.
Using the data in combination with various post-rent-control
dummy variables, we obtained estimates of the elasticity of substitu-
tion ranging from 0.32 to 0.65; the results of the regressions are
shown in Appendix 8A. Although these estimates left much to be
desired, we concluded that the elasticity of substitution for these
units was approximately 0.5, and we used this value as the elasticity
of substitution for the small, multiple-unit building. We lacked the
data for estimating the elasticity of substitution for the high-rise
structure, but we assumed that it had a higher elasticity than the
small, multiple unit buildings. This stems from our belief that a large
"plant" offers more possibilitiesfor substitution than a small
"plant." Accordingly, we set the elasticity of substitution for the
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highrise at 0.6, a value that is still within the range of estimated
elasticities for small multiple units. These elasticities of substitution
imply values for (3 of 1.0 for small structures and 0.67 for large ones.
TheDistribution Factor
Thedistribution factor,in a CESproductionfunction is an
important determinant of the share of output that each input factor
receives. Applying the usual first-order conditions to Equation
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which shows that(3and the input prices also play a role in
determining relative factor shares. Having determined (3forthe two
structure types, we went on to specify the prices of the inputs. We
set both P0 andequal to unity. Since =(r +d)we also had
to specify the interest and depreciation rates. We assumed that the
depreciation rate for quality capital was 10 percent per year and that
the interest rate was 5 percent per year.6 Hence, the ratio of Ph to
P0 was 0.15.
The ratio of factor shares specified in Equation (8-13) is not
directly observable because operating statements do not report Ph K,
the payment to quality capital, but they do contain enough informa-
tion to determine the ratio of operating expenses to maintenance
expenses. Moreover, we know that the ratio of maintenance expendi-
tures to total expenditures on quality capital is d/(r +d);so we can










Operatingdata were available to us from two sources: the time
series on Boston units used to estimate the elasticity of substitution
and a recent study of rent control in the Boston region (Sternlieb
1974). These data are shown in Table 8-1, and the ratios of
expenditures on operating inputs to expenditures on maintenance are
similar for comparable time periods and structure types. The ratio
for high-rise units is approximately 1.33 and the ratio for smaller
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periods 1.25 is a representative ratio for our small multiple unit
structures. Using these ratios of input shares we obtained values for a
of 0.906 for the latter and 0.812 for the high rises.
OtherParameters of the Supply Model
Wecan calculate the optimal stock of quality capital and the
optimal level of operating inputs using the production function in
Equation (8-12) and first-order conditions in Equation (8-13). The












Table 8-1.Operating and Maintenance Expenditures as Ratios to Gross Rents
and to Each Other,a 1942-1969 and 1971-1973
Expenditure
Item
Time Period or Structure Type
Uncontrolled Rents Controlled Rents
'65- '69 '55-'59 '50-55'45.'49 '42- '44
Key Data (1973, P. 45)
Operating inputs (0) 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.30
Maintenance and
repair (M) 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.15
Total 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.47 0.45
RatioofOtoM 1.24 1.50 1.48 2.13 2.36 2.00
.
Period of Uncontrolled Rents Period of Controlled Rents
High Rise Other High Rise Other
Sternlieb Data (1975, pp. 39-43)
Operating inputs (0) 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.21
Maintenance and •
repair (M) 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.16
Total 0.28 0.36 0.33 0.37
Ration of 0 toM 1.33 1.25 1.36 1.31
aThe data from Key are for 29 buildings. The Sternlieb data are for 12,068 units and cover
the period 197 1.1973.dies The Production of Housing Services 287
multiple unit Moreover, in the CES production function, minimum levels of each
values for a input are required to produce a given level of output. In our case this
means that the quality isoquant of each dwelling unit is asymptotic
to nonzero values of quality capital and operating inputs. For any
level of structure quality, Q,theminimum input requirements are
!capital and the
tion function in K (Q/A) (8-16)
tion (8-13). The
=(1
These conditions imply that dwelling units with specific levels of
quality capital will not be able to produce quality levels above a
certain point in the short run, a very plausible restriction for a model
of the housing market.
The final values we specified to complete our supply side model
were the prices of factor inputs across neighborhoods and the values
of dwelling unit quality to be produced. We assumed that all factor
prices across neighborhoods were equal except for the interest rate, r,
whichwe assume is 5 percent in good neighborhoods and 7 percent
in bad ones. This interest rate difference reflects differences in risk
betweenthe two neighborhoods. Setting the eight levels of dwelling
unitquality that will be produced was arbitrary; so we assumed A
equalledunity, and we scaled our eight quality levels to increase
logarithmically from the lowest to the highest quality level.
The parameters and dimensions of the supply model are summar-
ized in Table 8-2; in Table 8-3, we show the eight quality levels and
the long-run annual average cost of supplying each quality level by
each structure type in each neighborhood. The factor share data in
Table 8-1 show that expenditures on maintenance and operating
inputs claim from 28 to 47 percent of gross rents, and they imply
that the total cost of supplying quality (using our assumed values of r
andd) ranges from 34 to 62 percent of gross rents. Using these ratios
as rough guides, the annual rents for the dwelling unit quality levels
shown in Table 8-3 will be froin 1-2/3 to 3 times the cost of quality
for each quality level. That is, a typical gross rent for quality level 8
might range from $32 to $72 per month, and a typical gross rent for
quality level 1 might range from $190 to $430 per month. The factor
share data in Table 8-1 also suggest that owners devote a lower share
of gross rents to dwelling unit quality in high rises than in small
multipleunit structures. Structure capital and land costs are pre-
sumably higher for high-rise units than for low-rise ones.
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Table 8-2.Supply Model Parametersa
Structure Type






Good Neighborhood Bad Neighborhood
High Small High Small
Rise Multi Rise Multi
K* 1.90Q 1.66Q 1.83Q 1.61Q
0* 0.25Q O.21Q 0.26Q 0.22Q
Kmin 0.73Q 0.91Q 0.73Q 0.91Q
°min 0.08Q 0.09Q 0.08Q 0.09Q
Long-run marginal
cost per unit of Q 0.54 0.46 0.57 0.49
r 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07
d 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Po(0/Pm)M 1.33 1.25 1.42 1.32
aVarjables are defined infra.
Table 8-3.Quality Levels and Long-Run Average Cost of Quality per Dwelling
Unit per Year
Good Neighborhood Bad Neighborhood
Quality Level High Small High Small
No. Q Rise Multi Rise Multi
1 3,000 $1,605 $1,377 $1,713 $1,481
2 2,322 1,242 1,066 1,326 1,146
3 1,798 962 825 1,027 888
4 1,392 745 639 795 687
5 1,078 577 495 616 532
6 834 446 383 476 412
7 646 346 297 369 319
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productionfunction for structure quality are not perfect, but they
do suggest that different structure types are likely to have different
production functions. An alternative interpretation would be that
the various parameters and input prices constitute a partial sensitivity
test of the production function over a reasonable range of values.
SHORT-RUNADJUSTMENT PATHS
Inthis section we perform some experiments with the production
functions estimated in the previous section. In these experiments we
examine the rate at which housing producers can alter the levels of
structure quality produced by their units and the paths of short-run
average costs during the adjustment period. We concentrate on cases
where changes in patterns of demand will lead housing producers to
increase the level of structure quality they produce. This type of
demand shift is likely to accompany the introduction of a housing
allowance program in a metropolitan housing market. We limit our
analysis to the adjustment of structure quality and ignore possible
changes in the demand for structure type or neighborhood quality.
These latter two characteristics will be dealt with in the next section.
We begin by reviewing market conditions when the, supply of
structure quality in the housing market is in equilibrium. Since this
characteristic is elastic in supply in the long run and is produced by a
constant-returns-to-scale technology, the long-run supply curve will
be horizontal. All levels of quality produced will be equally profit-
able; the rent for structure quality will equal the long-run average
cost of production; and housing producers at each quality level will
have the optimal stock of quality capital. If demands for structure
quality suddenly increase, housing producers will immediately be
able to increase the quality level they produce by increasing operat-
ing inputs. In the short run, however, housing producers will no
longer have optimal capital stocks, and their short-run average costs
of producing structure quality will rise above long-run average costs.
Since the rents for quality will be determined by the costs of
• marginal producers at each quality level, the rents will rise in those
levels with increased demand. Over a number of periods, housing
producers will invest in quality capital until their stock of quality
capital attains its new optimal level. At this time, rents for structure
quality will again equal long-run average costs. In such a scenario at
least two questions are of interest: How much will rents for structure
quality increase in the short run? How long will it take for these
rents to return to their equilibrium levels?
L..
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Usingour production functions we can estimate rent changes from
cost changes under certain pricing rules.It is apparent that the
answers to these questions depend on several factors, including the
magnitude of the increase in demand and the amount of cash flow
available to the housing producer for investment. The cash flow
available is in turn related to the pricing rule followed. We will
assume that housing producers price their structure quality at
short-mn average cost. An average cost pricing rule is used because
the marginal housing producer in each quality level has an alternative
use for his unit: producing a lower quality level.
Short-RunRent Increases from Demand Shifts
Whena unit with the optimal stock of quality capital for quality
level L is used to produce quality level L + i, operating inputs must
be increased because the stock of quality capital is fixed in the short
run (the current period). In addition, operating inputs are not perfect
substitutes for quality capital; as shown in Equation (8-16), some
quality levels may not even be attainable in the short run. The data
in the following tabulation were computed using the short-run
average cost pricing rule. The figures show the percent increase in the
rent for structure quality that would be demanded by a housing
producer whose unit was used to produce structure quality with the
stock of quality capital that is optimal for a lower quality level:
Type 0
Number of Quality Levels Above That
for Which Capital Stock Is Optimal
1 2 3 4
High rise
Good neighborhood 0 8.1 50.2 312.5 —
Bad neighborhood 0 9.2 56.3 415.0 —
Small multi
Good neighborhood 0 12.4 162.1 — —
Bad neighborhood 0 13.5 235.0 — —
For example, if a high-rise unit in a good neighborhood has an
optimal stock of quality capital one level lower, the rent charge for
quality will be 8.1 percent above the long-run equilibrium rent for
quality. The data also illustrate that high-rise units, with their higher
elasticity of substitution, can move up three quality levels in the
short run while small multiple units can move up only two levels in
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It is clear that the magnitude of the short-run increase in rents for
qualitywill depend on the size of the demand shift and the
distribution over quality levels of the existing stock. For example, if
the increase in the demand for quality is moderate, dwelling units
might only shift to the next higher quality level, and the data in the
table suggest that quality rents would rise only from 8 to 13 percent
in the short run. If some units shifted two quality levels, quality
rents would rise much more, from 50 to 235 percent, and it would
be surprising if the increase in demand from a housing allowance
would be large enough to sustain a price rise of that magnitude. We
will investigate this question further when we operate the supply
model in conjunction with a demand model.
The percent change figures in the foregoing table remind us that
even in the very short run the production of dwelling unit quality
from the existing stock is not inelastic. Our production functions for
dwelling unit quality allow some substitution between inputs and
allow a range of adjustments of outputs. At the same time, however,
we see that sudden changes in demand are likely to produce rent
increases in some quality levels because some housing producers will
have nonoptimal capital stocks. These rent increases are not merely
income transfers to landlords; they represent payments for produc-
tion costs that are incurred by housing producers who suddenly find
themselves out of equilibrium. These short-run rent increases will
continue until housing producers can adjust their capital stocks to
new optimal levels. We now tryto determine how long this
adjustment might take.
Lengthof the Adjustment Period
Toreach a higher level of quality capital, a housing producer must
make net investments over time, and the time it takes him to reach
the new quality level will be a function of the resources he can
devote to investment. We analyze two options for financing net
investment that might be available to a housing producer: First we
assume that only cash generated by the unitisavailable for
investment and that he cannot borrow; and second, we assume he
can borrow funds to finance his investment and that he must pay off
his loan with his cash flow.
To simplify the case where investment is paid for directly out of
cash flow, we assume that the cash flow available for net investment
can be represented as a proportion of the stock of quality capital. If292 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
pis the proportion of quality capital available for net investment,
then the rate of change of quality capital, K, wifi be
which is a simple differential equation. Solving it yields the result,
1 K1
T11 =— (8-18)
where is the time required to move from capital stock K1 to
capital stockand pisthe proportion of the capital stock devoted
to net investment.
It will be recalled from Table 8-3 that the quality levels we use in
our model are scaled logarithmically; ratios of quality levels are
therefore constant multiples. Since the optimal stock of quality
capital is a linear function of quality, the ratios of optimal capital
stocks for different quality levels will also be constant multiples. As a
result, from Equation (8-18) we can see that the time required to
move a unit's capital stock up two levels will be twice that required
to move it up one level.
These properties of the adjustment period are illustrated in the
table below, where we show the number of time periods (in years)
required to increase the stock of quality capital of a dwelling unit by
one, two, or three quality levels as a function of p, the proportion of
quality capital invested each year. (Note that, given the parameters
of the model, the optimal stock of quality capital will range from




Proportion of Qua!ity CapitalIn vested Each Year
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.15
1 1 25.7 8.7 5.2 3.8 3.0 2.5 1.8
2 2 51.4 17.3 10.5 7.6 5.9 4.9 3.7
3 3 77.2 26.0 15.7 11.3 8.9 7.4 5.5
For example, a housing producer with 5 percent of his quality capital
available for net investment (roughly 5 'percent of gross rents) will
take approximately five years to attain the optimal stock of quality




A sense of the
conveyed by exa
of quality rents f
net investment i
percent increases































The Production of Housing Services 293
ofadjustment are independent of structure type and neighborhood
quality and depend only on the funds available for investment.
A sense of the path of rents during the adjustment period can be
conveyed by examining a particular unit. Figure 8-2 shows the path
of quality rents for a high-rise unit in a good neighborhood where the
net investment is 7 percent of quality capital. The rent paths are
percent increases over long-run levels for a unit that is being shifted
one, two, or three quality levels. The short-run rent levels decay
exponentially to their long-run equilibrium levels.
In calculating the length of the adjustment period, we have
assumed thusfar that housing producers try to pay for their
increased investments in quality capital on a current basis from their
net revenues. This may correspond to the way in which some housing
Time period
Figure 8-2.TimePath of Rentfor Quality during Adjustment with No Borrow-
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producersbehave, but others may borrow and finance expenditures available for in,
on additional quality capital. quality capital.
We now assume that housing producers can borrow money at a this case,
ratethat is higher than their long-run opportunity cost of capital, borrow at all to
r. Sinceexceeds r, a housing producer who borrows to increase his three quality 1ev
stock of quality capital to a level appropriate for quality level jmust adjustment perio
calculate a new desired capital stock, K7, that reflectsDuring the
current period, a housing producer can invest pm additional THESUPPLY M
quality capital. If he wishes to attain his new desired capital stock, he
must also borrow In this section
• quality with hoi
B =1(7—(K;+pK) (8-19) which the
where K is his existing stock of quality capital.
In the subsequent period the housing producer will produce
quality levelj with a stock of quality capital equal tohence, there 300 -
willbe some present-worth factor for interest ratethat is equal to E
B/pK7. By searching for this value in a table of present-worth factors '
forratewe can determine how many periods it will take to pay 250 -
backthe loan. For the term of the loan to be finite, it is obvious that
must be greater than B. Since we are examining only the .2
U supply side of the market we assume that the housing producer p
wants to minimize the short-run average costs of providing quality 200 -
leveljwithhis unit. Therefore, he will only take out a loan if
borrowing reduces his short-run average costs, and we define B0 as
the largest loan amount that will yield short-run average costs equal 150 -
tothose he would incur if he did not borrow. Combining these




If the housing producer does borrow and changes his capital stock 0
toK, the latter will remain at that level until the loan is repaid. In Upo
addition, his short-run average cost will be constant during this 2
period. After repayment, his cost of funds reverts to r; he invests in
his unit from current revenues to move it from K' to K*, and his
short-run average costs approach long-run coverage ?or quality
levelj.
Let us look at these calculations for the same unit we considered Figure 8-3.Time P








additional THESUPPLY MODEL IN A MARKET-CLEARING CONTEXT
capital stock, he
In this section we combine the supply model for dwelling unit
quality with household demands for housing. Demand equations in
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availablefor investment and amortization equal to 7 percent of
quality capital. In addition, let us assume that is10 percent. In
this case, illustrated in Figure 8-3, we find that it does not pay to
borrow at all to move up one quality level. However, to move two or
three quality levels, borrowing does pay, although the length of the































Figure 8-3.Time Path of Rent for Quality during Adjustment Period with Bor-
rowing (high rise unit in good neighborhood; P0.07;= 10 percent). j296 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
structure,and quality attributes of dwelling units represent the
housing demands of households. Housing producers supply dwelling
unit quality with existing units using operating and quality capital
inputs as described in earlier sections. We assume that neighborhood
quality levels are fixed. New construction and conversions between
structure types are not endogenous in the supply sector of the
model, but we have carried out some experiments with the model in
which new units are added exogenously in response to price changes.
This combination of supply and demand behavior can be envisaged
as representing a market for dwelling unit quality over time. At the
beginning of each time period 200 households distributed over six
income classes face a fixed stock of dwelling units and choose a unit
in which to reside for the current period. The market-clearing
procedure operates in two steps: First, using current-period expected
rents for structure quality, we alter the combined rents for neighbor-
hood and structure type until the market for these two (fixed)
attributesiscleared. Once the households are allocated among
neighborhoods and structures, a second market-clearing procedure is
used to clear the market for dwelling unit quality in each neighbor-
hood-structure combination. Since housing producers can alter the
level of dwelling unit quality they produce in the current period, this
second market-clearing procedure iterates between demand and
supply until the demands of households match the quality levels
supplied by housing producers at common rents for dwelling unit
quality. On the basis of established rents for dwelling unit quality,
housing producers form expectations about what the rents for
dwelling quality will be in future time periods, and they use these
expectations to determine their maintenance expenditure this period.
During the succeeding period, households and housing producers
recontract for quality levels, prices are revised, expectations are
reformulated,and maintenance decisions are made. When this
process has continued for several time periods and no changes have
been made in supply or demand parameters, an equilibriumis
reached. In addition, model parameters can be altered to generate
different equilibriums, which can be analyzed in terms of price and
quantity elasticities or other summary statistics.
In this section we present several partial equilibrium analyses or
sensitivity tests that involve changing various parameters of the
model and determining the effect these changes have on model
outcomes. In addition, we test an approximation to a housing
allowance program by altering the income distribution of house-
holds. Before describing the model experiments, we outline the
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The Household's Choice of Dwelling Unit
Ona given market day 200 households distributed over six income
classes participate in the model's market for neighborhoods, struc-
tures, and dwelling unit quality. The number of households is equal
to the number of available dwelling units in the market. A housing
bundle is characterized by the neighborhood, structure type, and
quality level it provides. The households have demand equations that







PR(N, S, Q,I)=proportionof households in income class I
choosing a unit of quality level Q,structuretype
S, and neighborhood N;
R(N, S; =rentfor a dwelling unit of quality level Qand
structure type S in neighborhood N;
coefficients of neighborhood quality, structure
type, dwelling unit quality, and rent for income
class I.
This demand equation is of the logit type, and its exponents can be
thought of as utility functions.
The market clearing is done in two steps. In the first step demand
and supply classified by neighborhood and structure are equated by
changing the rents for these attributes. The rent term, R(N, 5, Q),in
Equation (8-21) is separated into two components: the expected rent
for dwelling unit quality, R(Q), and the rent for neighborhood and
structure type, R(N, S).7 Since the supply of units by structure type
and neighborhood is fixed, R(N, S) is adjusted in the first stage of
market clearing until household demands are matched up with the
dwelling units available with these two attributes. In the second stage
of market clearing, R(N, S) is fixed, and demand and supply are
iterated within each neighborhood and structure type submarket
until the market for dwelling unit quality is cleared.
TheProvision of Dwelling Unit Quality
Givena schedule of demands for each of the eight possible quality
levels, housing producers must determine the least costly means of
meeting the demands at each level. Since each dwelling unit has a298 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
differentamount of capital associated with it, in terms of operating
inputs it is always less costly to produce units at the highest quality =
levelin with the largest amounts of quality capital; to
produce the second highest quality level in units with the next largest
amounts of quality capital; and so forth. This assignment of dwelling where
units to quality levels according to the amounts of quality capital
embodied in the units maximizes the total cash flow of landlords rent
subject to the constraint that the demand schedule of households struc
must be met. R(Q*) =long-
Given this technique of determining a production schedule that p =parar
minimizes the total cost of producing the quality levels demanded,
each quality level's marginal unit in the supply function can be Housing produc
determined by inspection. Because dwelling units are assigned to solution we assu
quality levels according to the stock of quality capital they embody, After
the marginal unit in each quality levelis the one with the least housing
amount of capital supplying that quality level. The full cost of and invests to
providing the given quality level with the marginal unit sets the rent most profitable
for quality, R(Q), in that quality level and is the sum of the cost of housing produci
the required operating inputs plus the one-period costs of capital set at zero if hi
embodied in the unit: level in the next
p0'+(r + d)K' (8.22) Parameters fo
Inorder to
where 0' are the required operating inputs for the quality level and for the demanc
K' is the unit's capital stock. Of course, each quality level will have a because we hay
different marginal unit and a different cost for its marginal unit. demand for qu
After the household demands have been matched to the supplies inconsistent, or
of quality levels and market-clearing rents for quality are formulated, unit characteris
each housing producer revises his rent expectations for the future the a's, a's,
and determines his maintenance expenditures for the current period. in Equation (8
A housing producer expects the long-run equilibrium rents for reasonable ist
quality to equal his long-run marginal costs. He must form expecta- (8.21). The ela
tions about rents in the next few periods because these expected qualitylevelC
rentsare the basis for his decision to produce a certain quality level structure, qualit
and to purchase additional capital this year. He knows the current
and past rents and the expected long-run rent. We assume that the
housing producer believes that rents will reach their long-run equilib-
rium by the end of a planning interval T periods long (in the program
we assume. that T =5).We believe that the housing producer expects
the change in rent next year to be some weighted average of the
change in rent this year and the average yearly change needed to
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=rentfor quality level Q for a given neighborhood and
structure type;
R(Q*) =long-runrents of quality level Q;and
p =parameterof expectations.
Housing producers may have different a's and T's. In the numerical
solution we assume they may have different a's only.
After forming his expectations concerning next year's rents, the
housing producer calculates his expected profit for each quality level
and invests to produce the quality level which he expects will be
most profitable to him in the next period. Since it is assumed that a
housing producer cannot sell his quality capital, maintenance will be
set at zero if his depreciated capital stock will be above the optimal
level in the next period.
Parametersfor the Dynamic Model
Inorder to run the dynamic model, parameters must be specified
for the demand side of the model. This specification is difficult
because we have little empirical evidence about the parameters of
demand for quality. Measures of dwelling unit quality are crude,
inconsistent, or poorly defined in most data that describe dwelling
unit characteristics. The demand parameters we have to choose are
the a's, p3's, y's, and 6 's in the household demand functions defined
in Equation (8-2 1). One way to insure that the parameters are
reasonable is to derive the choice elasticities implicit in Equation
(8-21). The elasticity of the probability of choosing a particular
qualitylevel can be determined for changes in neighborhood,
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where PR is the probability of choosing a particular combination of
dwelling unit attributes; and is the elasticity of the probability
with respect to
The model has six income classes, and the parameters of demand
can differ by income class. The parameters we used, shown in Table
8-4, are somewhat arbitrary but they produce reasonable distribu-
tions in the model. Table 8-4 also shows representative choice
elasticities of the probabilities of each attribute, and the parameters
were chosen with some consideration for what would be reasonable
elasticities.






1. Over $15,000 2.0 2.00 .002 —.00225
2. $10,000-15,000 2.0 1.90 .002 •—.00285
3. $7,000-10,000 2.0 1.85 .002 —.00345
4. $5,000-7,000 2.0 1.80 .002 —.00405
5. $3,000-6,000 2.0 1.75 .002 —.00465
6. $0-3,000 2.0 1.70 .002 —.00525
Elasticity Range for FR =0.2
1. Over $15,000 1.6-3.2 1.6-3.2 1-6 0.5-5.0
2. $10,000-15,000 1.6-3.2 1.5-3.0 1.6 0.6-6.3
3. $7,000-10,000 1.6-3.2 1.5-3.0 1.6 0.7-7.6
4. $5,000-7,000 1.6-3.2 1.4-2.9 1-6 0.8-8.9
5. $3,000-6,000 1.6-3.2 1.4-2.8 1-6 0.9-10.2
6. $0-3,000 1.6-3.2 1.3-2.7 1-6 1.1-11.2
Mt
26.
was N: 1 to 2 (1bad Note: In calculating elasticities, the range of the attributes used
neighborhood; 2 =goodneighborhood); S: 1 to 2 U =smaUmultiple; 2 =highrise); Q:
$500 to $3,000; and R: $250 to $2,750.
In addition to demand parameters, the distribution of households
by income and of dwelling units by N, S, and Qmustbe determined.
The distributors used in the model were derived from 1970 Census
data for the Boston SMSA. In order to generate these distributions
we assumed that the City of Boston represented the low-quality
neighborhood; and the suburbs, the high-quality neighborhood. In
addition, we classified buildings with three to nine units as the small,
multifamily structure type, and buildings with ten or more units as
high rises. The resultant percent distribution of renter families by
income class is shown in the following tabulation; the number of
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11.3% 19.4% 20.3% 14.6% 13.4% 21.0%
(22) (39) (41) (29) (27) (42)
The percent distribution of dwelling units by neighborhood and








Multi Rise Multi Rise
26.4% 20.2% 33.3% 20.0%
(53) (40) (67) (40)
The Basic Case
Whenoperated together the demand and supply portions of the
housing market model produce an equilibrium outcome that we term
the "basic case." In this equilibrium the rents expected by housing
producers and households equal the short-run market rents, and all
dwelling units have their long-run equilibrium capital stocks. In Table
8-5 some results from the equilibrium basic case are summarized.
The first part of Table 8-5 shows that high-income households are
more likely to reside in the more desirable structure type (S =2)and
the more desirable neighborhood (N =2)than are low-income
households. The rents shown for neighborhood and structure type,
R(N, S), are essentially demand-determined quasi-rents for the fixed
supplies of structure and neighborhood attributes. These quasi-rents
obviously would play a key role in determining either the construc-
tion of new structures in each neighborhood or the conversions from
one structure type to another.
The second part of Table 8-5 shows that the equilibrium distribu-
tion of dwelling quality varies across the neighborhood-structure
type combinations, a result we would expect given that these
combinationsattract income classesdifferentially. The column
labeled r(Q)displaysthe rent per unit of dwelling quality in each
neighborhood and structure combination. This per-unit rent is
constant acrossalllevels of dwelling quality because we have
assumed dwelling quality is produced by a constant returns to scale302 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
Table 8-5. Summary Results from the Equilibrium Solution
of the Basic Case
Neighborhood and Structure Type by Income Class
Income Classa Total No.
N S R(N,S) 1 2 3 4 5 6 of Households
1 1 17.2 2 6 9 8 10 18 53
1 2 415.7 4 8 9 6 5 8 40
2 1 560.1 6 13 15 10 9 14 67
2 2 1038.1 10 12 8 5 3 2 40
Total 22 39 41 29 27 42 200
Dwelling Unit Quality by Neighborhood and Structure Type
Quality LeveP' Total No.
N S r(Q) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8of Households
1 1 .49 7 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 53
1 2 .58 5 4 5 4 5 5 6 6 40
2 1 .4513 10 9 7 7 7 7 7 67
2 2 .54 8 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 40
Total 33 26 25 232223 2424 200
Percent Distribution of Dwelling Unit Quality by Income Class for
High Rise Dwelling in Bad Neighborhood (N—I, S2)
Income Quality Levela
Class 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
1 32%19%13%10% 8%7%6% 5% 100%
2 21 16 14 12 10 10 9 8 100
3 14 13 13 12 12 12 12 12 100
4 7 9 11 12 14 15 16 16 100
5 4 6 9 11 14 17 1920 100
6 2 4 7 10 14 18 2124 100
aThe income class equivalents are given in Table 8-4; the quality equivalents, in Table 8-3. N
=1designates a good neighborhood; N =2,a bad one. S =1designates a small, multiple-unit
dwelling; S =2,a high rise.
technology. The per-unit rent of dwelling quality differs by neighbor-
hood and structure type because of the specification of the model:
Recall that the parameters of the dwelling quality production
functions differ by structure type and that the price of capital differs
by neighborhood.
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Falents, in Table 8-3. N
sasmall, multiple-unit
quality levels by income class for a particular neighborhood and
structure type combination. Note how these distributions change
from the highest income class (=1) to the lowest (=6) and that the
distribution exhibits some evidence of diagonality.
Although the actual numbers shown in Table 8-5areprimarily
illustrative of how the housing market model works when the
demand and supply sides are integrated, they do remind us of the
implications of the model specifications we have employed. Many
other models that represent quality change or the production of
housing services over time assume that incremental investment or
maintenance applied to existing units isless efficient than new
construction, has decreasing returns to scale, or has decreasing
returns over time (de Leeuw; Sweeney). Since the supply model
presented here assumes constant returns to scale for incremental
investment in existing units, a decline in the quality of existing units
over time has not (in effect) been specified on the supply side. Inthis
model some changes on the supply side, e.g., an increase in the prices
of factor inputs, can change the quality of dwelling units over time,
but a more important cause of such changes is likely to be shifts in
the demand for the structure and neighborhood attributes of dwell-
ing units. Changes in the composition of demand within neighbor-
hood and structure type submarkets will alter the equilibrium quality
levels produced, and the latter can either increase or decrease
depending on the demographic or real income changes that occur. If
some heterogeneity is introduced into the representation of housing
stocks, changes in the quality of particular dwelling units over time
can result from demand changes as well as from possible decreasing
returns on the supply side. If housing is represented as a homogene-
ous good, however, quality change over time typically must stem
from the specification of diminishing returns to investment in
existing units.
SensitivityAnalyses of the Model
Inaddition to examining the basic case, we made several runs in
which parameters were changed and new equilibriums were attaiued.
Elasticities with respect to the parameter changes were calculated to
see how sensitive various equilibrium outputs of the model were to
such changes. In Table 8-6 we summarize seven sensitivity runs of the
model. The columns display the overall average of dwelling quality,
the average rent per unit of dwelling quality, the average quasi-rent
for neighborhood and structure type, and the average total expendi-
ture on housing. In all sensitivity runs the distribution of households
by income class and the distribution of dwelling units by neighbor-
ers by neighbor-















304 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
Table 8-6.Sensitivity Tests: Results Aggregated over All Households
— —





Level 1,533 0.504 463 1,235
2.
3.
IncreaseP0by 50% (1.0 to 1.5)
Level 1,312 0.611 459
Elasticity —0.29 0.42 —0.02
Increase Interest Rates 50% (7.0 to 10.5; 5.0 to 7.5)
Level 1,423 0.554 471





4.Reduce Interest Rate in N =2by 50% (5.0 to 2.5)
Level 1,596 0.480 496
Elasticity —0.08 0.09 —0.14
1,262
—0.04
5.Raise Elasticity of Substitution inS =2by 10% (0.6 to 0.66)
Level 1,575 0.486 484
Elasticity 0.27 —0.36 0.45
1,250
0.12
6.Raisefor S =2by 10% (0.812 to 0.893)
Level 1,626 0.453 531
Elasticity 0.60 —1.0 1.5
1,268
0.26
7.Demand Coefficient of Q Reduced 25% (0.002 to 0.0015)
Level 1,244 0.504 470
Elasticity 0.75 0 —0.06
1,096
0.45
8.Demand Coefficient of Rent Reduced 10%
LeveL 1,549 0.504 509


























Note: Elasticities are calculated with respect to parametric changes.
.
hoodand structure type remain fixed. Runs 2 through 6 alter
parameters of the supply side: runs 2 and 3 change the costs of
producing quality in all units, and runs 4, 5, and 6 alter supply costs
in only one neighborhood or one structure type. Runs 7 and 8 alter
demand coefficients for all households.
A. comparison of runs 2 through 6 with the basic case shows that
average total expenditure is fairly constant, increasing by a maximum
of 2 percent. In these runs households respond to changes in r(Q) by
varying the amount of quality they purchase. This is shown in Figure
8-4, which displays what is esentially a demand curve for dwelling
quality. Of course, this relation is complicated somewhat by changes
in R(N, S), the quasi-rents for N and S. Runs 7 and 8, in which
demand coefficients are altered, produce somewhat larger changes in





















































Note: Numbered points refer to runs in Table 8.6.
Figure 8-4.Quality versus Rent for Quality from Tests of Supply
Parameters.
unaltered;and r(Q)keepsits basic case value, but the altered demand
parameters produce changes in the average level of quality consumed.
Table 8-7 displays average values and elasticities for model outputs
by structure type and neighborhood. Supply changes limited to one
structure type or neighborhood (runs 4, 5, and 6) tend to produce
their largest effects on units with the attributes affected by the
altered parameters. Note, for example, that in run 4 the first
neighborhod results are very similar to those of the basic case, and in
run 5 the structure 1 results are little changed from the basic case. In
these two runs supply changes are made in neighborhood 2 and
structure 2, respectively.
The sensitivity tests show that model results are, indeed, respon-
sive to parameter values. The importance of the demand parameters,
while not surprising, compounds the problems on the demand side of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Production of Housing Services 307
Experimenting with Housing Allowances
Thefinal exercises performed with the model incorporate a
representation of a housing allowance program, which is simulated
by altering the income distribution of households in the model. The
top portion of Table 8-8 displays changes made in the income
distribution of the model that roughly correspond to the imple-
mentation of a housing allowance program. Two runs were made
with the altered income distribution. In the first run no other
changes were made, and in particular the distribution of dwelling
units by neighborhood and structure type was unchanged. In the
second run this distribution was changed by adding two units in the
neighborhood 2, structure type 2 category and subtracting two units
in the neighborhood 1, structure 1 category; this change is intended
to represent new construction that might occur in response to
increase in quasi-rents for neighborhood and structural type in the
first run.
The lower section of Table 8-8 summarizes results from the two
housing allowance runs and presents comparable figures from the
basic case run. When the supply is held fixed the change in income





IncomeDistribution Changes for Housing Allowance (number of households)
Run
Income aass
1 2 3 4 5 6
BasicCase 22 39 41 29 27 42
Allowance 22 39 41 37 42 19
Change 0 0 0 +8 +15 —23
N S Q
Summary of Results from Allowance Simulations
Basic Case Fixed Supply Altered Supply
Av.Tot.- Av.Tot.- Av.Tot.
R(N,S)Expend.QR(N,S) ExpendQR(N,S) Expend.
1 1 1,429 17.2 7131,458 15.8 7261,456 16.6 726
122 1,381416 1,2111,413430 1,2441,413420 1,234
21 1 1,635500 1,2421,672514 1,2731,672505 1,264
222 1,6541,038 1,9281,654 1,060 1,9501,620 1,029 1,901
Weighted
average1,533463 1,2351,560474 1,2581,553463 1,243
aThe income class limits are given in Table 8-3. N =1designates a good neighborhood; N =
2,a bad one. S =1designates a small, multiple-unit dwelling; S =2,a high rise.308 Modeling the Housing Market and Selected Housing Policies
averagequality levels consumed, and a slight rise in total housing fixed by Nan
expenditures. It appears that the higher incomes are used to bid up basic Case,bu
rents for the fixed attributes (N and S) and to raise quality in three quality levels.
of the four N and S categories. The slight alteration in supply in the the average lei
second run returns the quasi-rents nearly to their levels in the basic case, but the s
case, raises the average quality level consumed, and increases total level, as in th
housing expenditures relative to the basic case. lowest quality
A more detailed description of the two housing allowance runs and structure t
and a comparison with the basic case are presented in Table 8-9, Although ti
which shows the distribution over dwelling quality levels for each may OCCUT un




Table8-9.HousingAllowanceRunsand Quality Levelsa (number of obvious,h0w4
households) demandequa
Quality Level housing progra
N S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
CONCLUSION
1 1 7 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 53
1 2 5 4 5 4 5 5 6 6 40 In this study
2 1 13 10 9 7 7 7 7 7 67 supply that e
2 2 8 i ± dwelling units.
Total 33 26 25 23 22 23 24 24 200 '. distinguished:'
quality. The p1
Allowance with Fixed Supply that parallel ti
1 1 7 7 6 7 6 6 7 7 53 firm;decisions
1 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 '5 6 40 1Y' were made
2 1 14 10 9 7 7 7 7 6 67 ment
2 2 8 6 5 5 4 4 4 4 A productio
Total 34 28 24 24 22 22 23 23 200
' wasspecified f
Change from
' forit were e
basic case +1 +2 —1 +1 0 —1 —1 —1 dwelling units.
two structure I
Allowance with Altered Supply cal experiment
1 1 8 7 6 6 5 6 6 7 51 ranges of valu
1 2 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 40
' duration,that
2 1 14 10 9 7 7 7 7 6 67 increases dema
2 2 7 6 5 4 5 could be quite
Total 34 28 24 22 22 23 23 24 200 demand for str
Change from from 4 to 7 pe
basic case +1 +2 —1 —1 0 0 —1 0 likely dissipate
The supply
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fixedby N and S, the quality levels consumed increase relative to the
basic case, but in a complicated manner as households shift among
quality levels. When the stock of units is altered in the second run,
the average level of quality consumed still exceeds that in the basic
case, but the same number of households consume the lowest quality
level, as in the basic case. In addition, the number of units of the
lowest quality level has increased in the most desirable neighborhood
and structure type.
Although these runs are merely illustrative of the changes that
may occur under a housing allowance regime, they do suggest that
households may use increased dollars to buy structure or neighbor-
hood attributes they desire rather than dweUing unit quality. In fact,
housing allowances might in some cases encourage households to
trade off dwelling unit quality for these other attributes.Itis
obvious, however, that we must have more data to support the
demand equation parameters before we can project impacts of
housing programs with any confidence.
CONCLUSION
7 7 53
In this study we presented a theoretical representation of housing
supply that emphasizes the operation of the existing stock of
dwelling units. Three major characteristics of dwelling units were
distinguished: structure quality, structure type, and neighborhood
quality. The production of dwelling unit quality was treated in terms
that parallel the choice of optimal plant size in the theory of the
firm; decisions about structure type, although treated less complete-
ly, were made in accordance with the usual assumptions of invest-
ment theory.
A production function having constant elasticity of substitution
was specified for the production of structure quality, and parameters
forit were estimated from available data on the operation of
dwelling units. The quantitative version of the model distinguished
two structure types and two levels of neighborhood quality. Numeri-
cal experiments were performed with the model to determine likely
ranges of values for short-run increases in rents, as well as their
duration, that might accompany any housing market policy that
increases demands for structure quality. Although increases in rents
could be quite large in the very short run, moderate increases in the
demand for structure quality would probably increase gross rents by
frcm 4 to 7 percent in the short run, and these rent increases would
likely dissipate in less than six years.
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framework with demand equations for housing attributes. Several
sensitivity analyses were performed with this market model, and
some preliminary housing allowance experiments were reported on.
These experiments suggested that housing allowances increase the
average quality of housing consumed, but may lead some households
to substitute neighborhood quality or structure attributes for dwell-
ing quality.
We stressed the role of operating inputs and maintenance in
short-run adjustments of existing units.Expenditures on these
factors constitute an important component of the costs of producing
housing, and they typically receive little attention in analyses of
housing markets.
Finally, we gave much attention here to the short-run dynamics of
housing market adjustment processes, not only because of their
importance in gauging the response of the housing market to specific
policy proposals, now under consideration, but also because more
complete representation of these adjustment mechanisms will in-
crease our abilityto judge the appropriateness of equilibrium
assumptions in the housing market.
APPENDIX8A: ESTIMATES OF THE
ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION BETWEEN
OPERATING INPUTS AND CAPITAL
Theestimation of the elasticity of substitution between operating
inputs and capital in the production of structure quality depends on
several assumptions, which we describe here. We begin by deriving





= ——(ciK+ (1 ci)(—(3)
(8A-1)
which with substitution leads to
dQo (8A-2)
By rearranging terms, we obtain the equation to be estimated:
(1 (8A-3)The Production of Housing Seivices 311
ributes.Several
I whereP0 and PQ are the prices (or price indexes) of operating inputs
ket model, and and structure quality, respectively. Estimating Equation (8A-3) is
ere reported on. impossible because we do not observe Qdirectly.However, we do
ices increase the have data on rent payments and expenditures on operating inputs,
;ome households and we can obtain price indexes for rents and operating inputs, 0,
ibutes for dwell- over time. We then estimate the equation
maintenance in
itures on these
of producing R/PR S




iarket to specific and obtain b, which is an estimate of the elasticity of substitution if
because more S is a good proxy for Q.Swould be a good proxy if, for example,
hanisms will in- the ratio Q/S were constant. Such constancy is unlikely throughout
of equilibrium the entire period covered by our data, perhaps most notably because
rent control was in effect until March 1956. The major control for
variations in Q/S used in the estimation is a dummy variable that
distinguishes years with rent control from years without, a technique
that assumes Q/S was constant within the two periods.
The price index for rents used in the estimation is the Boston rent
index drawn from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price
tweenoperating Indexes in Selected SMSA 's,andit is available from 1944 to the
ality depends on present. Two price indexes reported in the same publication were
egin by deriving used for operating inputs: the Boston consumer price index, available
inction in Equa- over the whole time span of the sample; and a price index for utilities
and fuel, which can be readily constructed from 1953 on. Separate
estimates of the elasticity of substitution were made using these two
indexes for the price of operating inputs, and a graphical display of
the data is shown in Figures 8A-1 and 8A-2. It is clear from Figure
(8A-1) 8A-1, in which the CPI is used as the price index of operating inputs,
that the sample seems to be broken into a rent control and
• post-rent-control period, except that both 1956 and 1957 appear to
be part of the former period. Both 1956 and 1957 appear to be in
the rent control period in Figure 8A-2 as well, where the index of
(8A-2) utilities and fuels is used as the price of operating inputs. Because of
the difficulty of defining the post-rent-control period with a dummy
variable, two definitions were used: Dl, which covers 1958-1969;
•stimated: and D2, for 1956-1969. Regression estimates of the elasticity of
substitution using these dummy variables are shown in the following
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Figure 8A-1.Elasticity of Substitution Using Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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—0.20 —0.10 0 0.10
Log (utility price index/rent index)
Figure 8A-2.Elasticity of Substitution Using Utility and Fuel Index.




1. Of course, this problem is not limited to housing capital; see Feldstein and
Rothschild (1974).
2. Note that maintenance is defined as gross investment in quality capital and
excludes operating inputs.
3. An exposition of this approach is given in Dildine and Massey (1974).
4. Alternatively,mightincrease with the amount borrowed.
5. Operating expenses do not include property taxes. Details of the estima-
tion are presented in Appendix 8A.
6. Since only quality capital depreciates, if the average depreciation rate for
housing is 2 percent, we are assuming that quality capital amounts to one-fifth
of the value of a unit.
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The authors concentrate on the supply behavior of owners of
existing rental housing. Their chief emphasis is on a distinction
among three types of housing structure inputs with notably different
longevities: structural capital, quality capital, and operating inputs.
The three have different depreciation rates:essentially zero for
structural capital, which is assumed to have an indefinite lifetime;
one-period durability for operating inputs; and in-between for qual-
ity capital. Moreover, structural capital has a discontinuous cost
function; and quality capital and operating inputs are deemed to
have smooth substitution possibilities with one another.
What is gained from this tnchotomy? First, a clear basis for
generating the distinction between short- and long-run supply adjust-
ments. Second, an interesting discussion of the transition adjustment
process. There is an illuminating simulation application to a demand-
supply interaction, with bOth policy runs and sensitivity analysis that
carry a reasonably realistic ring. Thus, the distinctions are instructive;
they highlight some important issues in supply—mostly relating to
individual production and cost functions, and individual supplier
behavior.
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Butthe treatment does at the same time slight other important
issuesin housing supply: for example, questions about market
structure, the aggregate supply behavior of different groups, compet-
ing types of supply, and the impact of different forms of competi-
tion—across tenure classes, structure types, neighborhoods, different
quality levels, and between new construction and conversion. It
excludes custom suppliers, i.e., those who are simply direct agents of
users. Moreover, the emphasis on rental housing is too insulated.
There is no note taken that market opportunities in the rental
sector—the relation between rents and quality—depend on what is
happening to demand and supply for ownership units: households
can trade off across tenure classes.
PRODUCTIONFUNCTION
Assumingthe structural capital of existing units to be fixed, the
authors treat the production of structural quality as a process
involving quality capital and operating inputs in a CES production
function. This entails continuous tradeoffs with constant elasticity of
substitution and constant returns to scale over an indefinite range of
structural quality. While thereis. some ambiguity as to what is
included in the category. of quality capital, this treatment reflects
what may be a serious misrepresentation of the technical opportuni-
ties of changing the quality of existing structures. I shall begin by
briefly characterizing what I take to be some salient features of such
opportunities, and then relate these to the present treatment.
A given housing structure constrains future changes in quality in a
variety of ways: (1) through size, general layout, materials, plumb-
ing; (2) through more specific architectural features, such as number
of rooms; (3) through particular installations, decorations, appli-
ances;(4) throughagivenstateof condition(repairs,etc.);
(5) through a set of current services associated with occupancy, such
asheating, garbage removal,cleanliness,etc.These groups are
ordered in terms of the degree of constraint each exercises on future
changes in quality. Groups 1 and 2 especially exert important
technical, as well as aesthetic, complementarities that are absent, or
must be violated, under significant conversion. Thus, in a housing
supply model I have been working on for some time, if levels of
overall quality are specified, for any given quality level new construc-
tion permits achievement of that level at a lower total cost than can
be attained by converting an existing unit to the given level from
some different starting level. The discrepancy between the two in
totalcostsisgreater the greater the required change through
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These fundamental features may depreciate in terms of rental
earning ability, indeed may even be totally written off in an
accounting sense, and yet may continue to exert technical con-
straints on conversion because they physically remain. Not economic
relevance but physical relevance is the basis of this influence. Explicit
demolition costs are needed fully to undo the constraints, and
demolition services should represent a genuine component of the
production function.
Groups 3, 4, and 5 exert decreasing constraints on "coversions" in
a broad sense of deliberate quality changes in existing units, with 5
alterable almost without constraint. But while these groups of
characteristics can be more easily varied, they are also less important
components of the housing package from the point of view of the
u.ser; and considerable alteration in these components increasingly
strains basic complementarities with the more fundamental aspects
of the housing package. increasing the frequency of redecorat-
ing does less and less to enhance living in a tiny apartment with
abysmal plumbing. Even various combinations of changes in these
types, of components should have decreasing enhancement effect on
user quality as the latter diverges increasingly from conventional
balance with the more long-lived features of the housing unit.
Thus, conversion seems to involve a technology of decreasing
returns to scale, whatever combination of inputs is involved (and
whether or not new construction involves constant returns to scale).
The more basic components affect user welfare strongly but are
increasingly expensive in real resource costs. Demolition is required
to liberate some aspects of the technical opportunities, but demoli-
tion requires a heavy use of resources, and this must be included as a
genuine cost of the process. The less structurally intrinsic compo-
nents are easier to vary in different combinations, but they are likely
to have progressively less effect on user welfare when attached to
unchanged basic features of the housing unit, and thus increasingly
large package additions must be made to obtain equal impact on
quality—a possibly more pronounced situation of decreasing returns
to scale than for more basic conversions.
It is not clear what groups of components are included in "quality
capital" as employed in the paper. The selection of a 15 percent
depreciation rate in the original version (now reduced to 10 percent
after serious questioning) plus oral discussion at the conference
suggest that categories 4 and 5 and some shorter-lived items of 3 are
intended. This seriously restricts the scope of the analysis, since it
omits what many researchers in the field would consider the most
important aspects of conversion. Property owners are not likely to
attempt more than modest changes in quality by resort to these
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componentsalone. Larger quality changes are very likely to involve A distinction
the more basic components as well. Yet, for the reasons given above, raising quality
the criticism against a technology of constant returns to scale holds especially
even for this reduced menu of conversions, the basic stru
The above emphasis on. technical constraints and complementari- changes in the
ties has a broader significance than merely to suggest that constant typically accoi
returns are inappropriate. It implies that long-run outcomes are much of constructioi
more influenced by past and present supply decisions than the either a compi
authors allow. (In the model the constant low cost of production prowdeless
the long run wipes out all influence of the past after an extremely operating serv
modest transition period.) •resources. The
Given a present stock of housing with specific character, as and requirec
demand changes to create new market opportunities, the newly upward and soi
attractive quality levels can be obtained at lower total cost through
new construction rather than by converting existing units. (Such
. ESTIMATION
conversions have rising average cost functions.) But some of these SUBSTITUTIO
latter might nonetheless outcompete the new units because the DISTR IBUTIO
decision to convert is based on conversion plus opportunity costs,
not total costs, and this sum is often much lower than total costs.
.Theuse of an:
(Net revenue at the original quality level, whiôh would be foregone quality is
by conversion, comprises the opportunity cost.) Technical con- balance of m
straints on the particular units presently existing with help determine housing units
where such conversion can successfully compete with new construe- controlled for i
tion and thus help determine the character of the overall response,
, Theoriginal
even though new-construction technology in principle dominates of operating i
conversion in the long run. specific expend
The long run, indeed, in this view, does not totally differ in move depende
character from a succession of short-run transitions, unlike in the present version
Ingram-Oron model. Existing units do not disappear in any long run: utilities index,
they are maintained, or converted, and so they continue to exist in representation
every period, imposing their influence on the overall supply posture. gives a more to
Short-run sequences are the long run. Throughout this process, the "Guesstimat
character of existing stocks in each period is both a reflection of past high-rise and I
supply decisions and an important influence on future ones. give 0.5 for
Temporal sequences resulting from policy and other changes belief "that a
impinging on the system are an important part of the study. Its sharp than a small
cleavagebetween short-run transitions and long-run equilibriums, one structureis m
of the presumed fruits of its distinctions among different types of
housing input, is in fact based on an overly simple conceptualization, constraints an
The difficulty stems from the authors' relative neglect of the market low-rise structi
aggregation level—with that variety of competitive relationship whose once the struc
absence we noted early in these remarks. for the plannil
One final remark should be made about the production function. both in absolu
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to involve A distinction should be made between the involved in
given above, raising quality and the technology involved in lowering it. This is
s to scale holds especially important if quality capital is meant to include elements .of
the basic structure of the housing unit, with the result that, e.g.,
changes in the "scale" of the unit are envisaged. Raising quality is
that constant typically accomplished by positive investment of resources: a form
are much of construction. Lowering quality can, however, be accomplished by
than the
i
eithera comparable form of investment, i.e., by using resources to
f production in provide less space in more units, or by allowing the condition or
r an extremely operating servicesto decline,i.e.,by refraining from spending
resources. These are likely to involve different cost characteristics
character, as and require different gestation periods—an asymmetry between
ies, the newly upward and some downward conversions.
cost through




ian total costs. The use of annual average rent per room as a measure of structural.
ild be foregone quality is unsatisfactory. It confounds structural quality with the
Technical con- balance of market forces. Neighborhoods and other aspects of
help determine housing units differ and influence average rent. These are not
new construc- controlled for in the authors' procedure.
verall response, The original use of the consumer price index to represent the price
dominates of operating inputs was questionable because the latter comprise
specific expenditure items and types of labor services that do not
differ in move dependently with the index over the business cycle. In the
unlikein the present version of the study, the CPI is supplemented by the fuel and
in any long run: utilities index, and this is an improvement. The problem of proper
inue to exist in representation is still not solved, but the present procedure probably
posture. gives a more tolerable approximation.
his process, the "Guesstimates" for the relativeelasticityof substitution for
of past high-rise and low-rise structures may be inappropriate. The authors
ones, give 0.5 for low-rise and 0.6 for high-rise structures because of their
other changes belief "that a large 'plant' offers more possibilities for substitution
Its sharp than a small 'plant'." In fact, the reverse may be true. A high-rise
tuilibriums, one structureis more complex than a low rise, with many tightly
tferent types of complementary linkages among structural components. Architectural
constraints are probably more formidable for high-rise than for
Itofthe market low-rise structures, permitting less substitution among components
Itionshipwhose once the structure is already built (the authors' belief probably holds
ction function
for the planning stage). The guesstimates used in the study may err
both in absolute and comparative terms. This is important because in
I I
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the simulations performed much depends on the elasticity of substi.
tution.
In the original version of the study a depreciation rate of 15
percent per year was chosen for quality capital. That seemed much
too high if quality capital covered significant aspects of the housing
unit. The criterion for depreciation in this use is not marketability
(or risk) of the unit but the exercise of constraints in conversions.
The authors have now lowered it to 10 percent per year. This is
certainlyin the rightdirection. Moreover, if quality capitalis
restrictedmostly to appliances and other nonintrinsic installations, as
the conference discussion suggested, 10 percent may be appropriate.
But, as I suggested above, this would considerably limit the scope
and interest of the study. A more inclusive category, to make




Theanalytical model proceeds on the assumption that each supplier
(owner) has perfect knowledge of the relation between rent levels
and quality 'levels over at least a planning interval of four or five
years.
This appears to neglect some important aspects of rents as market
phenomena. For example, housing supply typically has a long
gestation period. A producer, whether of new or converted units, will
often not know what other similar supply activities are "in the
works" at any time. This can affect price—notably through triggering
uninformed supply behavior. Secondly, it seems to omit the market
effects of types of endogenous supply behavior competitive with the
type of conversion focused on, namely, new construction and
structural conversion. Changes in these latter supply modes should
affect price; hence, when known or anticipated by quality con-
verters, they should influence the behavior of the latter. If supply
responses through other modes had short gestation periods, each
converter could easily perceive the market price effects, and the
assumed correct predictions of these would be apt. But gestation
periods for the other modes are also lengthy—some lengthier than for
this mode. So the same uninformedness holds here too.
Another issue, in addition to the prediction problem created by
long gestation periods, is the aggregate competitiveness across supply
modes. The proposed aggregate response of the supply mode in
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competitive with it and thus change market opportunities. Unless
these two-way intermodal relationships are comprehended in the
model in an explicitly dynamic setting, it is difficult to interpret the
meaning of the assumption of accurate individual rent-quality predic-
tions over the planning period.
FUNDING AND INTEREST RATES
The model assumes an unlimited 'amount of funds can be borrowed
at a given fixed interest rate. This neglects the possibility of a
(smoothly) rising cost of capital as a function of the level of new
construction and conversions and thus partially endogenous. Alterna-
tively, it neglects the possibility of credit rationing.
OVERALLEVALUATION
Thisstudy represents a useful inquiry into some of the theoretical
and empirical issues involved in modeling housing supply. Many
important issues have been excluded—as must be the case in all finite
research. Unfortunately, however, some of these exclusions bias the
results concerning what is included. The treatment of some of the
empirical issues is defective in a way that shows how inherently






























Thisrigorous study by Ingram and Oron isof major
importance because of the way it treats heterogeneity in
housing. Its treatment is unique among housing models
because, on the supply side, the production functions for different
characteristics of housing are allowed to differ, and on the demand
side, different characteristics of the housing bundle are entered as
separate arguments in the utility function. This treatment, and only
this treatment, makes it possible to focus on a question of crucial
concern for public policy: What bundle of housing characteristics
would a household consume after receiving a housing allowance?
To emphasize the importance of this question, let us pose the
following: Would voters support a housing allowance if recipients
used it merely to purchase better-located housing? If in fact voters
would support an allowance only if it were used to increase the
quality and size of dwellings, the simulation results suggest great
difficulty for any allowance program. For these results show the
interaction of demand and supply resulting in a tiny decrease, or no
decrease at all, in the amount of the lowest-quality housing. Is this
arresting result to be taken seriously? Quite seriously, I believe, but
there are some problems in the analysis.
One problem is the incomplete specification of the characteristics
of the housing stock. Ingram and Oron distinguish four: structure
type, structure quality, neighborhood quality, and accessibility. To
be complete, the specification should include another characteristic:
dwelling unit size. As the concepts are currently defined, neither
structure type nor structure quality encompasses this characteristic.
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On the one hand, structure capital refers just to the foundation and
shell. There is nothing explicitly disallowing the possibility of a given
shell containing, say, three large units instead of four smaller ones;
and in the simulation experiments the authors use two structure
types which differ in number of dwelling units but not in dwelling
unit size. On the other hand, structure quality does not encompass
dwelling size. We infer this from the high depreciation rate (10
percent) assumed for quality capital, and from the characterization
of increments in quality capital as maintenance. Furthermore, in
their empirical estimation, the authors take rent per room to
represent quality; this allows quality to reflect the size of rooms, but
not their number. In my view, dwelling unit size should be explicitly
included as a separate characteristic, rather than merged into either
the structure type or structure quality concepts. There is substantial
evidence that the demand parameters for these three aspects of
housing differ greatly.'
A further problem in the authors' treatment of heterogeneity is
their lack of complete carryover from the analytical section to the
simulations. While structure quality is endogenously determined in
the simulations, structure type is not. In addition, in the simulations,
as in the analysis, neighborhood quality is exogenous, and of course,
dwelling unit size is omitted. Thus, in the simulations we have two
polar extremes of supply elasticity: the supply of structure type—and
the neighborhood—is perfectly inelastic, while, because of the nature
of the assumed production function, the supply of structure quality
is perfectly elastic. Ceteris paribus, then, the increase in structure
quality resulting from a housing allowance is biased upward, and the
change in structure type (and dwelling unit size) is biased downward.
In view of this, the actual simulation result—an absence of any
change in the number of units of the worst quality level in the less
desirable neighborhood (Table 8-9, middle section, rows one and
two)—is indeed remarkable.
We suspect that if two kinds of changes were made, the results
would be much more favorable to a housing allowance. First, the
authors' demand equations assume that (1) the strength of prefer-
ence for neighborhood quality relative to structure quality is pre-
cisely the same for low-income as for high-income households (Table
8-4) and (2) the elasticity of the probability of a household's
choosing a particular quality level declines as the quality level
declines (Equation (8-27)). The Bailey (1966) hypothesis of segrega-
tion suggests that assumption (1) is inappropriate and should be
changed to make low-income households prefer neighborhood qual-
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constant elasticity, would substantially increase the structure quality
demand of households in the allowance-receiving groups. And as the
authors comment, simulation results for the quantity of quality are
certainly sensitive to changes in the demand parameters (Table 8-4
and 8-7).
The second kind of change I suspect would make a substantial
difference to the results would be the introduction, as suggested
above, of dwelling size as a separate characteristic. Some of the
housing allowance used to purchase neighborhood quality would be
diverted to increase the number of rooms. Since I suspect that the
number of rooms, especially in low-rise structures, is relatively elastic
in supply, the simulation result might be a substantial reduction in
the number of units with few rooms. Voters would be inclined to
accept an allowance program, I believe, if it resulted in more privacy
(less crowding) as well as greater structure quality.
These comments point up the importance of the specification of
an "additions" function; this would be required where dwelling unit
size is taken to refer to square feet of space rather than number of
rooms. This problem is, of course, closely associated with the knotty
problem of specifying a function for cost of conversion to a different
structure type. No such function is given, but perhaps the problem
would become more tractable if space and number of rooms were
explicitly part of the model.
Finally, I would like to see the supply side of the model modified
to accommodate the effects of income and property taxes. These do
not properly belong under the heading of "fixed costs" (Equation
(8-3)). Often, appraisal practice makes property tax a function of
total capital (i.e., here, Kr), so taxes rise with increments in quality
capital. This increases the price of quality capital relative to the price
of operating inputs, and also increases the price of quality.
NOTETO COMMENT ON CHAPTER EIGHT
1. SeeDavid (1962) and note that to a large extent the owner-tenant split is a
proxy for a structure-type split. Also see Straszheim (1975, tables 4.5.4.7) but
note that the latter assumes that elasticities do not change with income.
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